io.github.chrischall/gogcli-mcp-slides

It requires GOG_ACCOUNT and GOG_PATH. The former appears account-related and the latter a local path setting; this creates normal credential or account-context misuse risk, but the materials do not show unusually sensitive secrets or explicit credential exfiltration behavior.

The system metadata lists no declared remote host, but given the stated purpose of operating Google Slides via gogcli, interaction with the relevant service is functionally likely. The materials do not specify endpoints, data flows, or unrelated third-party destinations, so this is a normal network caution rather than a clear exfiltration red flag.

It is explicitly marked as executes-code, meaning it can start local processes or run related code/CLI components. That is a normal MCP capability; the available materials do not show requests for system privileges beyond what deck/slide authoring would ordinarily need, so this warrants caution but not a high-risk rating.

The need for GOG_PATH indicates access to at least some local path; combined with slide authoring, it may read or write data related to assets, generated output, or configuration. The materials do not define exact file scope and do not show obvious overbroad authorization, so this is a standard local data-access caution.

It comes from an official registry and has an open-source repository with updates within the last year, all of which reduce risk. However, the missing README, undeclared license, and zero-star adoption limit verifiability and maturity. Overall, the supply chain is auditable but incompletely documented, so caution is appropriate.