io.github.us-all/google-drive

It requires GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, GOOGLE_REFRESH_TOKEN, and service-account/application credential variables; these are all highly sensitive authentication materials. The presence of GOOGLE_IMPERSONATE_USER and configurable scopes means overly broad setup or leakage could enable persistent access to Drive/Workspace data or user impersonation.

Although no explicit host is listed in the materials, the stated Google Drive + Workspace functionality necessarily implies communication with Google cloud APIs. Documents, spreadsheets, slides, shared drive metadata, and related content handled through the tool may be sent to Google service endpoints, which is the normal egress path for this type of integration.

The system flags executes-code, indicating this MCP runs locally as a process/service and executes its own logic. The available materials do not show requests for additional system-level permissions unrelated to its stated function, so this is rated as caution based on inherent MCP runtime capability.

It claims support for Docs, Sheets, Slides, Shared Drives, Labels, and Approvals, and includes controls such as GOOGLE_DRIVE_ALLOW_WRITE and GOOGLE_DRIVE_SCOPES, indicating potential read access and, when enabled, modification of a broad range of Workspace data. If service accounts, DWD/impersonation, or broad scopes are used, the access surface expands further, so scopes and write access should be tightly constrained.

It comes from an official registry, has an auditable open-source repository, and has been updated within the last year—these are clear positive supply-chain signals. Although community stars are low and README/license information is limited, the current materials show no high-risk red flags such as closed-source unexplained exfiltration, abandonment, or obvious deception.